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Making the Hallways Safe: Using Title IX to Combat
Peer Sexual Harassment
Gregory E. Karpenko*
In the spring of 1993, fifth-grader LaShonda Davis wrote a
suicide note indicating she was going to end her life because of
the sexual abuse she endured during her fifth grade year.'
Throughout the year, LaShonda was tormented by a fellow
fifth grader, named "G.F." by the courts, who constantly har-
assed and abused LaShonda.2 G.F.'s actions included trying to
touch LaShonda's breast and vaginal areas and saying "I want
to get in bed with you" and "I want to feel your boobs."3 On one
occasion, G.F. placed a doorstop in his pants and mimicked
sexual acts.' As the year passed, G.F.'s harassment became so
severe that he was charged with and pled guilty to sexual bat-
tery.5
Throughout the year, LaShonda continually complained to
school officials. These officials did nothing to remedy G.F.'s
sexual harassment.' In fact, they even denied LaShonda's re-
quest to be moved from a classroom seat next to G.F.7 After
one particular incident of sexual harassment, LaShonda and
several other girls requested permission from their teacher to
report G.F. to the principal.' To the girls' surprise, the teacher
responded, "If he [the principal] wants you, he'll call you."9 Af-
* J.D. Candidate 1998, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1995,
Valparaiso University.
1. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1189 (11th Cir.),
reh'g granted and opinion vacated, 91 F.3d 1418 (11th Cir. 1996).
2. Id. at 1188-89.









ter another incident, the principal asked LaShonda "why she
was the only one complaining."'0
Until recently, neither the American public nor the courts
recognized the problems of peer sexual harassment." Recent
studies, however, demonstrate the staggering prevalence of
peer sexual harassment and the threat it poses to our school
systems. 12 These studies also illustrate the damage peer sex-
ual harassment causes to the mental and emotional develop-
ment of young male and female students. 3
One of the most promising statutory vehicles for address-
ing peer sexual harassment is Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972.14 Title IX prohibits sex discrimination
10. Id.
11 See Monica L. Sherer, Comment, No Longer Just Child's Play: School
Liability Under Title IX for Peer Sexual Harassment, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2119,
2121-23 (1993) (noting that peer sexual harassment issues have been largely
absent from legal and nonlegal literature, research studies, and the court-
room).
12. A 1993 study by the American Association of University Women Edu-
cation Foundation (AAUW) found that 85% of girls and 76% of boys in grades
eight through eleven have been the victims of unwanted sexual comments or
touching in school. AMERICAN ASSN OF UNIV. WOMEN EDUC. FOUND.,
HOSTILE HALLWAYS: THE AAUW SURVEY OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN
AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 7 (1993) [hereinafter AAUW]. Of the girls reporting sex-
ual harassment, 66% reported experiencing harassment "often" or "occasionally."
Id.; see also NOW LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUC. FUND & WELLESLEY COLLEGE
CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON WOMEN, SECRETS IN PUBLIC: SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN
OUR SCHOOLS 2 (1993) [hereinafter NOW/WELLESLEY] (finding that 83% of
girls ages 9 to 19 have been touched, pinched, or grabbed and that 39% re-
ported that this harassment occurred daily).
13. See, e.g., AAUW, supra note 12, at 15 (finding that of the girls who
were victims of sexual harassment, 33% did not want to attend school, 32%
did not want to talk in class as often, and 24% skipped class or school to avoid
the harassment). The testimonies of Title IX plaintiffs seeking redress for
peer sexual harassment bear out the sad story contained in the survey re-
sults. See, e.g., Schofield ex rel. Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist.,
935 F. Supp. 162, 166 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating that sexual harassment by
peers made the plaintiff feel unsafe and depressed, and interfered with her
education). Bruneau's experience is typical of peer sexual harassment vic-
tims, who commonly display symptoms such as insomnia, listlessness and de-
pression. See Sherer, supra note 11, at 2133-34 (describing the physical and
emotional consequences of peer sexual harassment). One commentator ob-
served that "[i]f sexual harassment is allowed to occur it disrupts the right to
equal education by interfering with the student's psychological, social, and
physical well-being, plus learning, attendance, course choices, grades and
therefore economic potential." Susan Strauss, Sexual Harassment in the
School: Legal Implications for Principals, NAT'L ASSN OF SECONDARY SCH.
PRINCIPALS BULL., Mar. 1988, at 93.
14. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1994).
1272 [Vol. 81:1271
PEER SEXUAL HARASSMENT
by federally funded educational institutions. 15 While the Su-
preme Court has yet to consider Title IX liability for a school's
failure to remedy peer sexual harassment, lower federal courts
have used Title IX to recognize peer hostile environment sex-
ual harassment and impose school liability) 6 The courts rec-
ognizing peer hostile environment sexual harassment claims
disagree, however, about the nature of school liability. Fed-
eral courts are currently split over whether a student seeking
damages under Title IX must prove intentional discrimination
or whether the student may state a claim using the Title VII
"knew or should have known" liability standard.17
The absence of a definitive legal standard for assessing
school liability prevents our society from addressing the al-
ready difficult problem of peer sexual harassment. The confu-
sion in federal courts leaves student victims unsure of their le-
gal rights and, as a result, may discourage them from seeking
relief in the courts. 8 Furthermore, the absence of a definitive
liability standard provides little incentive for schools to adopt
peer sexual harassment policies and programs that address the
problem of peer sexual harassment.19
This Note argues that courts should allow a victim of peer
sexual harassment to recover monetary damages under Title
IX when a school intentionally discriminates against-the stu-
dent on the basis of sex by failing to remedy the abuse. Part I
briefly describes the development of Title IX as a tool for
fighting sexual harassment in educational institutions and Ti-
tle ]X's relationship to Title VI and Title VII of the Civil Rights
15. See infra notes 20-21 and accompanying text (describing the purpose
of Title IX and quoting the statutory language).
16. See infra notes 89-124 and accompanying text (summarizing cases
addressing peer sexual harassment under Title IX).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 84-88 (stating that federal courts
currently apply four different standards to determine school liability).
18. A clear legal standard is essential because numerous factors already
cause many young victims of sexual harassment to be unwilling to report
abuse. See SUSAN STRAUSS, SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND TEENS: A PROGRAM
FOR POSITIVE CHANGE 117 (1992) (noting that many teens do not report sex-
ual harassment because they blame themselves, do not know how to report
incidents, do not trust their perception of the events, are afraid to create a
scene, are embarrassed, or do not think that reporting will make a difference).
A clear legal standard of liability will at least give students the knowledge
that if their school fails to act on reports of peer sexual harassment, the courts
can provide a remedy.
19. See Sherer, supra note 11, at 2165-66 (arguing that a clear cause of
action would provide an incentive for school officials to promptly investigate
and discipline instances of peer sexual harassment).
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Act of 1964. Part II outlines the Supreme Court's approval of
monetary damages in Title IX claims and the lower federal
courts' recognition of a Title IX claim for victims of peer sexual
harassment. Part III argues that Title IX plaintiffs must prove
that schools intentionally discriminated on the basis of sex to
receive monetary damages for failure to remedy peer sexual
harassment. In support of this claim, Part I demonstrates
that Title VII standards are inconsistent with Title IX prece-
dent, that proof of intentional discrimination meets the re-
quirements of Title IX, and that public policy supports adopt-
ing intentional discrimination standards instead of Title VII
"knew or should have known" liability.
I. STATUTORY HISTORY OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
A. TITLE IX AS A REMEDY FOR SEX DISCRIMINATION
Congress enacted Title IX in 1972 to protect individuals
from sex discrimination within federally funded educational
institutions. 0 Title IX provides that [n1o person in the United
States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal fi-
nancial assistance."2 Prior to the passage of Title IX, no legal
remedy was available to victims of sexual harassment in edu-
cational institutions because of a peculiar gap that existed be-
tween Title VI and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Title VI prohibits discrimination in all federally funded pro-
grams but does not regard gender as a prohibited classifica-
tion.22 Conversely, Title VII prohibits sex discrimination in the
workplace but originally exempted educational institutions
from its scope.23
20. Senator Birch Bayh, the sponsor of the Senate bill, stated that Title
IX "is a strong and comprehensive measure which I believe is needed if we are
to provide women with solid legal protection as they seek education and
training for later careers." 118 CONG. REC. 5803, 5806-07 (1972) (statement of
Sen. Bayh).
21. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994).
22. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4 (1994) (prohibiting discrimination
based on race, color, or national origin by recipients of federal funds).
23. See Kirsten M. Eriksson, Note, What Our Children Are Really Learn-
ing in School: Using Title IX to Combat Peer Sexual Harassment, 83 GEO. L.J.
1799, 1803 (1995) (noting that Congress enacted Title IX in part to fill the gap
between Title VI and Title VII).
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After passing Title VI and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, Congress recognized that these statutes failed to pro-
tect women in educational institutions.' Accordingly, Con-
gress amended the Civil Rights Act in 1972, adding Title IX.
Title IX addressed the problem of sex discrimination in educa-
tional institutions by prohibiting financial aid and admissions
procedures which deterred female application and admission to
colleges. In addition, Title IX protected women employed in
educational institutions from sex-based discrimination by ex-
tending protection similar to that guaranteed to workers in
noneducational workplaces by Title VII.2 6
Title ]Xis language, however, did not specify what types of
sex discrimination constitute a violation of Title IX or the
methods by which a plaintiff may establish her case. 7 Legis-
lative history made it clear that sexually discriminatory ad-
mission procedures and employment practices violated Title
IX, but did not address issues such as sexual harassment of
students..28 As a result, courts had no congressional guidance
for assessing many sexual harassment claims brought under
Title IX. Lacking clear congressional intent, courts supple-
mented Title IX by drawing from established Title VI and Title
VII case law.29
24. See id. (noting that "[tihe data presented to Congress during the Title
IX debates clearly showed that women were being discriminated against in
the field of education").
25. See 118 CONG. REC. 5803 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh) (explaining
that "the heart of this amendment is a provision banning sex discrimination in
educational programs receiving Federal funds [which] would cover such cru-
cial aspects as admissions procedures [and] scholarships").
26. See id. at 5812 (statement of Sen. Bayh) (explaining that Title IX
deals with discrimination "in employment within an institution, as a member
of a faculty or whatever").
27. See Jill Suzanne Miller, Title V7 and Title VII: Happy Together As a
Resolution to Title JX Peer Sexual Harassment Claims, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV.
699, 714-15 (noting that Title IX fails to provide any guidelines as to what
types of sex discrimination are actionable under Title IX).
28. See, e.g., supra notes 25-26 (quoting testimony by Senator Bayh con-
cerning the focus of Title IX).
29. See, e.g., Yusuf v. Vassar College, 35 F.3d 709, 714-15 (2d Cir. 1994)
(finding that in the case of gender discrimination occurring in college discipli-
nary proceedings, courts should interpret Title IX by looking to the body of
law developed under Title VI as well as the case law interpreting Title VII);
Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 832 (10th Cir. 1993)
(stating that Title VII provides "the most appropriate analogue when defining
Title DICs substantive standards") (quoting Mabry v. State Bd. of Community
Colleges & Occupational Educ., 813 F.2d 311, 316 n.6 (10th Cir. 1987)).
12751997]
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B. TiTLE VI: TITLE IX'S PARENT STATUTE
Title VI states that "[nlo person in the United States shall,
on the grounds of race, color, or national origin, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Fed-
eral financial assistance." ° Although Title VI does not refer to
gender, its language closely resembles the statutory language
of Title IX.31 These similarities exist because Congress inten-
tionally modeled Title IX on Title VI, providing in Title Xs
provisions that Title VI regulations should be incorporated into
Title M.32 This evidence of congressional intent and the simi-
larity of language led the Supreme Court to interpret the two
statutes in a similar manner.3
The liability of federally funded educational institutions
under Title VI is limited by the fact that Congress enacted Ti-
tle VI pursuant to its Spending Clause powers.34 Under this
power, Congress may place conditions upon the receipt of fed-
eral aid in return for compliance with federal conditions. 5 To
receive federal aid under Title VI, recipients cannot discrimi-
nate on the basis of race, color, or national origin. Because
spending power legislation is comparable to a contract, federal
aid recipients are not bound by federally imposed conditions
unless they "voluntarily and knowingly" accept the terms of the
contract.36 Hence, the remedies available to private plaintiffs
under Spending Clause statutes are typically limited to de-
claratory and injunctive relief.37
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
3L See supra text accompanying note 21 (quoting Title IX).
32. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.71 (1995) (incorporating provisions of Title VI in
regulations implementing Title IX).
33. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694-99 (1979)
(describing the similarities between Title VI and Title IX to justify fashioning
a private right of action under Title IX similar to the right already recognized
under Title VI).
34. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of New York, 463 U.S. 582,
598-99 (1983) (noting that Title VI is Spending Clause legislation).
35. See id. at 599-602 (quoting Title VI legislative history describing Title
VI as a contractual relationship and concluding that injunctive relief is the
only available remedy under the statute).
36. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)
(noting that Spending Clause legislation resembles a contract because the
states agree to comply with certain conditions in exchange for federal funds).
37. See id. at 29-30 (explaining that the contractual nature of a Title VI
spending grant limits the remedies available to plaintiffs in a private suit be-
cause an action by a private plaintiff introduces costs not originally considered
1276 [Vol. 81:1271
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In Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Commission of New
York,38 the Supreme Court extended the remedies available to
plaintiffs under Spending Clause statutes. In so doing, it dis-
tinguished between intentional and unintentional violations of
Title VI. The Court stated that Title VI plaintiffs were limited
to injunctive relief for unintentional violations of Title VI,39 but
noted that a plaintiff proving intentional discrimination is en-
titled to compensatory relief.4"
C. TITLE VII SEXUAL HARASSMENT LITIGATION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an em-
ployer from discriminating against any individual with respect
to "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin."41 The House of Representatives added the
classification of sex with limited discussion shortly before vot-
ing on the bill.42 As a result, courts and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the agency Congress created
to enforce Title VII, can refer to no legislative history to de-
when the grant recipient accepted the federal money). The Pennhurst court
further held that a federal grant recipient must always have the choice of
complying with the additional obligations and duties mandated by the court's
ruling or terminating its receipt of federal funds. Id. In accordance with the
contractual nature of federal grants under the Spending Power, the Pennhurst
court noted that it had never "required a [grant recipient] to provide money to
plaintiffs." Id. at 29.
38. 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
39. Id. at 607.
40. Id. at 597. Seven members of the Guardians Court agreed that a
violation of Title VI itself required proof of discriminatory intent. See id. at
608 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring) (summarizing the Court's division on the issue
of intent). A separate majority found that a plaintiff could establish a viola-
tion of Title Vi's implementing regulations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 with
proof of discriminatory impact alone. See id. at 607 n.27 (explaining that
"[tihe dissenters, Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, join
[Justice White] to form a majority upholding the validity of the regulations
incorporating a disparate-impact standard"); Eriksson, supra note 23, at 1813
(noting that "[a] different majority . . . held that Title VIs implementing
regulations prohibit actions or regulations that have a disparate impact on
minorities").
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
42. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1986) (citing
110 CONG. REC. H2577 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1964)). Opponents of the amendment
to add sex to Title VIrs list of prohibited characteristics argued that sex dis-
crimination was different from other forms of discrimination and should re-
ceive separate legislative redress. Id. at 64. This argument failed and Con-




termine what Congress intended by prohibiting discrimination
based on sex.
Both the courts and the EEOC determined, however, that
sexual harassment violates Title VII's prohibition of sex dis-
crimination. The EEOC issued guidelines classifying the types
of sexual harassment which violate Title VII. These guidelines
state:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual har-
assment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explic-
itly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment,
(2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used
as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3)
such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering
with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive working environment. 43
Under these guidelines sexual harassment occurs in one of
two forms: "quid pro quo" sexual harassment or "hostile envi-
ronment" harassment." An employer commits quid pro quo
sexual harassment when the employer promises an employee a
job benefit should the employee perform a sexual act with the
employer, or when the employer threatens to fire the employee
if the employee objects to sexual overtures.45 Conversely, hos-
tile environment sexual harassment involves non-economic
threats.46 Hostile environment sexual harassment occurs when
"unwelcome sexual attention . . 'creates an intimidating
workplace or interferes with an employee's job performance.' 47
Federal courts have recognized that Title VII's prohibition
on sex discrimination encompasses both quid pro quo and
hostile environment sexual harassment.48 Originally, lower
43. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1996). Before defining "sexual harassment,"
the EEOC first stated that sexual harassment is indeed a form of sex dis-
crimination which violates Title VII. Id.
44. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65 (introducing the two different forms of
sexual harassment).
45. See id. (describing activities that would constitute quid pro quo sexual
harassment).
46. Id. at 65-67.
47. Alexandra A. Bodnar, Arming Students for Battle: Amending Title IX
to Combat the Sexual Harassment of Students by Students in Primary and
Secondary School, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 549, 567 (1996)
(quoting Jollee Faber, Expanding Title 1X of the Education Amendments of
1972 to Prohibit Student to Student Sexual Harassment, 2 UCLA WOMEN'S
L.J. 85, 90 (1992)). Bodnar lists sexual jokes, remarks, touching, or porno-
graphic displays as examples of unwelcome sexual attention. Id.
48. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64-65.
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federal courts only recognized hostile environment discrimina-
tion claims for classifications based on race, religion, and na-
tional origin. 9 Following the EEOC's pronouncement in 1980
that sexual harassment violates Title VII, federal district and
appellate courts used existing precedent on hostile environ-
ment causes of action to hold that Title VII prohibited hostile
environment sexual harassment as well as quid pro quo sexual
harassment. ° In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,1 the Su-
preme Court agreed with the lower courts and held that both
quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual harassment vio-
late Title VII.5 2 The Supreme Court found that "[f]or sexual
harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or
pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment
and create an abusive working environment.'" 53
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court failed to define the
standard of intent required for employer liability in a hostile
environment sexual harassment case.54 Taking note of Con-
49. In Rogers v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Fifth
Circuit became the first circuit court to recognize a discriminatory work envi-
ronment claim. 454 F.2d 234, 239 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957
(1972). The Rogers court found that an employer who created a hostile work
environment for a Hispanic employee by engaging in discriminatory treat-
ment of Hispanic clientele violated Title VII. Id.
50. For example, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit stated in
Henson v. City of Dundee:
Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment
for members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual
equality at the workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality.
Surely, a requirement that a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual
abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed to work and make a
living can be as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of ra-
cial epithets.
682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982).
51. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
52. Id. at 64-66.
53. Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th
Cir. 1982)). The Supreme Court returned to the issue of severity in Harris v.
Forklift Systems., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993). In Harris, the Court stated that
the Meritor standard requires both an objectively hostile work environment
and the victim's subjective perception that the conduct is abusive. Id. at 370.
The Court adopted a totality of circumstances approach for determining the
existence of an objectively hostile environment. Id. at 371. The Court held,
however, that hostile environment sexual harassment need not "seriously af-
fect [an employee's) psychological well-being" or cause actual injury before it
creates a cause of action under Title VII. Id.
54. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72. The district court adopted a standard requir-
ing that the employer have notice of the hostile environment. Id. at 69. The
court of appeals took the opposite view, holding the employer "strictly liable
12791997]
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gress's decision to define "employer" in Title VII to include "any
'agent' of an employer,"5 the Court found a congressional in-
tent to "place some limits on the acts of employees for which
employers under Title VII are to be held responsible."56 Ac-
cordingly, the Court stated that, although employers are not
automatically liable for sexual harassment by their supervi-
sors, the absence of notice "does not necessarily insulate that
employer from liability."57
While the Supreme Court declined to decide what level of
employer intent or notice plaintiffs must show to establish
hostile environment sexual harassment claims under Title VII,
federal appellate courts have uniformly held that an employer
will be liable for the acts of a supervisor, coworker or third
party if the employer knew or should have known of the hostile
environment and took insufficient remedial action.58 To prove
hostile environment sexual harassment, therefore, federal ap-
pellate courts require that a plaintiff show that:
(1) [the plaintiff] belongs to a protected group; (2) [the plaintiff] was
subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harassment was
based on sex; (4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privi-
lege of employment; and (5) [the defendant] knew or should have
known of the harassment and failed to take proper remedial actions 9
D. THE DEVELOPMENT OF TITLE IX AS A TOOL FOR ADDRESSING
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Courts first expanded Title IX's capacity to address sexual
harassment by adopting Title VII case law. In 1977, the Dis-
trict Court of Connecticut in Alexander v. Yale University' be-
for a hostile environment created by a supervisor's sexual advances, even
though the employer neither knew nor reasonably could have known of the
alleged misconduct." Id. at 69-70. The court of appeals held that strict liabil-
ity applied because the supervisor is "necessarily an 'agent' of his employer for
all Title VII purposes." Id. at 70.
55. Id. at 72 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 949 F. Supp. 1415, 1421-
22 (N.D. Cal. 1996). For cases holding that employers will be liable for acts of
coworkers, supervisors, or third parties if they know or should have known of
the sexual harassment and did not take reasonable steps to eliminate it, see,
for example, Murray v. New York University College of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243,
249 (2nd Cir. 1995); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Hacienda
Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1515-16 (9th Cir. 1989); Hall v. Gus Construction Co.,
842 F.2d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir. 1988).
59. Kopp v. Samaritan Health Sys., Inc., 13 F.3d 264,269 (8th Cir. 1993).
60. 459 F. Supp 1 (D. Conn. 1977), affd, 631 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1980).
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came the first court to hold that Title IX recognized a cause of
action for quid pro quo sexual harassment.61 The court reached
its holding by analogizing the alleged quid pro quo sexual har-
assment to Title VII's prohibition of similar harassment in the
workplace. 62 The court found it "perfectly reasonable to main-
tain that academic advancement conditioned upon submission
to sexual demands constitutes sex discrimination in education,just as questions of job retention or promotion tied to sexual
demands from supervisors have become increasingly recog-
nized as potential violations of Title Virs ban against sex dis-
crimination in employment."63
In 1981, the Office for Civil Rights of the U.S. Department
of Education (OCR), the agency that administers Title IX, rec-
ognized the expansion of Title IX by promulgating its own
definition of sexual harassment.' The OCR Policy Memoran-
dum defined sexual harassment as "verbal or physical conduct
of a sexual nature, imposed on the basis of sex, by an employee
or agent of the recipient, that denies, limits, provides different,
or conditions the provision of aid, benefits, services or treat-
ment protected under title IX."I5
Subsequently, the Supreme Court expanded the scope of
Title IX sexual harassment claims. In Cannon v. University of
Chicago,66 the Court used Title VI jurisprudence to create a
private right of action for Title IX plaintiffs.67 Then, in North
Haven Board of Education v. Bell,68 the Supreme Court stated
61. Id. at 4-5.
62. Id. at 4.
63. Id.
64. See Stacey R. Rinestine, Comment, Terrorism on the Playground:
What Can Be Done?, 32 DUQ. L. REV. 799, 806 (1994) (discussing the defini-
tion of sexual harassment and noting that the OCR Policy Memorandum did
not define sexual harassment in the student-to-student context). The OCR
published the memorandum specifically to address federal financial grant re-
cipients who were engaging in sexual harassment. See id. (noting that the
OCR Policy Memorandum did nothing to protect students from peer sexual
harassment).
65. Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1015 (5th Cir.
1996) (citing OCR Policy Memorandum from Antonio J. Califa, Director of
Litigation, Enforcement, and Policy Service, to Regional Civil Rights Directors
10 (Aug. 31, 1981) (on file with author) [hereinafter OCR Policy Memoran-"
dum]).
66. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
67. Id. at 694-98.
68. 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
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that when determining its scope, courts should accord Title IX
"a sweep as broad as its language."69
Federal courts continued to expand the scope of Title IX by
returning to Title VII jurisprudence and recognizing a cause of
action for hostile environment sexual harassment in claims
brought by employees of educational institutions.70 The Tenth
Circuit stated that Title VII should serve as the source for Title
X's hostile environment sexual harassment standard because
Title VII prohibits the "identical conduct" proscribed by Title
IX.71 The First Circuit agreed, holding that an educational in-
stitution could be held liable under Title IX upon a finding that
the institution knew or reasonably should have known of the
hostile environment sexual harassment and failed to take re-
medial action.72
II. THE FRANKLIN DECISION AND ITS EFFECT ON
TITLE IX LIABILITY STANDARDS
While the Supreme Court created a private right of action
in Cannon, the only remedy available to Title IX plaintiffs was
injunctive relief, which denied financial aid to the institution if
it engaged in sexually discriminatory practices.7 3 In the land-
mark case of Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 4
69. Id. at 521.
70. See Moire v. Temple Univ. Sch. of Med., 613 F. Supp. 1360, 1366-67
(E.D. Pa. 1985) (adopting the Title VII hostile work environment sexual har-
assment standard in a Title IX claim), affd mem., 800 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.
1986).
71. Mabry v. State Bd. of Community Colleges and Occupational Educ.,
813 F.2d 311, 316 n.6 (10th Cir. 1987).
72. See Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 901 (1st Cir.
1988) (holding an educational institution liable under Title IX for failing to
remedy hostile environment sexual harassment perpetrated by supervisors
and coworkers of the plaintif).
73. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704-05 (1979).
74. 503 U.S. 60 (1992). Christine Franklin, a student in the Gwinnett
County Public School system, alleged in her complaint that her teacher had
sexually harassed her on an ongoing basis by asking her about her sexual ex-
periences, asking her whether she would have sex with an older man, forcibly
kissing her on the mouth, telephoning her at home, and coercing her to have
intercourse with him. Id. at 63. Franklin did not allege that her teacher
conditioned her academic achievement upon submission to his sexual de-
mands. She alleged that other teachers and administrators, though aware of
the harassment, did not try to prevent the continued abuse. Id. at 63-64.
Franklin sued the school district for damages under Title IX, stating that the




however, the Supreme Court unanimously held that private
plaintiffs could receive monetary damages for intentional vio-
lations of Title IX.75 In authorizing an award for damages un-
der Title IX, the Supreme Court relied upon the presumption
that Congress intends that all appropriate remedies are avail-
able to plaintiffs unless it expressly indicates otherwise.76 The
Supreme Court rejected the argument that the presumption of
appropriate remedies should not apply because Congress en-
acted Title IX pursuant to its Spending Clause power.77 The
Court noted that monetary damages are not permitted for un-
intentional violations of Spending Clause statutes because the
"receiving entity of federal funds lacks notice that it will be li-
able for a monetary award."78 Lack of notice does not exist,
however, when the plaintiff alleges intentional discrimina-
tion.79
In Franklin, the Supreme Court stated that Title IX
"unquestionably"80 imposed a duty on the school district not to
discriminate on the basis of sex. The Court found that Gwin-
nett County discriminated on the basis of sex by analogizing
teacher/student harassment to Title VII employment discrimi-
nation cases.8" Citing Meritor, a Title VII case, the Court stated
that "when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because
of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor 'discriminates' on the
basis of sex."8" The Court concluded that the same rule of liabil-
ity should apply in the Title IX context when a teacher sexually
harasses a student. 3
While Franklin clarified that damages are available for
violations of Title IX, the decision left considerable confusion
75. Id. at 76. The sole issue on appeal in Franklin was whether or not
Title IX supported a claim for monetary damages. Id. at 65-66.
76. Id. at 66 (citing Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 246-47 (1979)).
77. Id. at 74. The Supreme Court did not determine which power Con-
gress utilized in enacting Title IX because it concluded that a money damages
remedy was available regardless of the constitutional source of Title IX. Id. at
75 n.8. The defendant also argued that the traditional presumption of appro-
priate relief should not apply because an award of damages would violate
separation of powers principles and because Title IX relief should be limited
to backpay and prospective relief. Id. at 73-76. The Supreme Court rejected
both arguments. Id.
78. Id. at 74.
79. Id. at 74-75.
80. Id. at 75.
81. Id.




as to what a plaintiff must prove to state a Title IX claim
against a school district for its failure to remedy hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment. Federal courts addressing this
issue disagree over whether a student seeking damages under
Title IX must prove intent to discriminate on the part of the
school board, or whether the student may state a claim using
the Title VII "knew or should have known" liability standard.
Federal circuit and district court opinions have developed
four different standards for school board liability: (1) Title VII
"knew or should have known" liability;84 (2) actual notice;85
(3) intentional discrimination proven by direct and circum-
stantial evidence;86 and (4) disparate treatment.87 Title VII li-
ability standards hold the school district liable if it knew or
should have known of the sexual harassment and failed to take
adequate steps to remedy the problem. Actual notice liability
limits school board liability to situations where the school had
actual knowledge of the discrimination. The third and forth
standards function as variations of requiring intentional dis-
crimination for school liability. The intentional discrimination
by direct and circumstantial evidence standard requires the
plaintiff to prove intentional discrimination, but allows the
court to infer the existence of intentional discrimination when
the school fails to address reports of peer sexual harassment.
The disparate treatment liability standard requires plaintiffs
to prove that the school intentionally discriminated by re-
sponding differently to claims of sexual harassment based on a
student's gender. The Title VII liability standard and inten-
tional discrimination approaches represent the dominant
resolutions of the issue of school liability and the heart of the
current federal court split.88
84- See infra part H.A (describing the Eleventh Circuit and the Northern
District Court of California's adoption of Title VII standards).
85. See infra note 88 (describing the Northern District of New Yorlks
adoption of the actual notice standard).
86. See infra part II.B (outlining the "intentional discrimination through
direct and circumstantial evidence" standard).
87. See infra part H.C (reciting the Fifth Circuit's approach to school
board liability).
88. The Northern District of New York in Schofield ex rel. Bruneau v.
South Kortright Central School District became the only court to adopt the
actual notice standard for school board liability. 935 F. Supp. 162, 173
(N.D.N.Y. 1996). In Bruneau, the court adopted Title VII standards in gen-
eral but declined to adopt a "knew or should have known" liability standard
because the agency relationships inherent in the employer-employee relation-
ship do not exist between students and the school. Id. at 170-74. As of this
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A. TITLE VII "KNEW OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN" LiABliTY
In Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education,89 the Elev-
enth Circuit addressed the issue of school board liability for
peer sexual harassment." Noting the connection drawn be-
tween Title VII standards and Title IX by the Supreme Court
in Franklin,91 and the Court's mandate to read Title IX
broadly,92 the Davis court concluded that Title IX encompasses
a claim for hostile environment peer sexual harassment in the
same manner as Title VII.93 The court also cited a Letter of
Finding by the OCR stating that "[i]f the harassment is carried
out by non-agent students, the institution may nevertheless be
found in noncompliance with Title IX if it failed to respond
adequately to actual or constructive notice of the harass-
ment."94 Based on its determination that Title VII standards
were appropriate, the Davis court found that a school board
could be held liable if it "knew or should have known" of the
harassment and failed to take remedial action.9 5
Note's publication, no other court or commentator had adopted the "actual
notice" liability standard. As a practical matter, the actual notice standard
produces the same results as the intentional discrimination through direct
and circumstantial evidence standard. Both standards require some form of
direct knowledge of the harassment before school liability can occur, and both
standards infer liability from this knowledge. Because the actual notice stan-
dard produces results identical to another standard and only one court has
adopted the actual notice standard, it will not be discussed in this Note.
89. 74 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir.), rehg en banc granted, opinion vacated, 91
F.3d 1418 (11th Cir. 1996).
90. The Eleventh Circuit, however, vacated the Davis decision and
granted a rehearing en banc. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d
1418 (11th Cir. 1996). The initial decision nonetheless merits mention be-
cause of its centrality in subsequent federal court opinions. At the time this
Note was written, the Eleventh Circuit had not reheard the case.
91. Davis, 74 F.3d at 1190-92. The Davis court also noted the use of the
Franklin opinion by lower courts as authority for applying Title VII standards
to student sexual harassment claims under Title IX: "The [Franklin] Court's
citation of Meritor .... a Title VII case, in support of Franklin's central
holding indicates that, in a Title IX suit for gender discrimination based on
sexual harassment of a student, an educational institution may be held liable
under standards similar to those applied in cases under Title VII." Murray v.
New York Univ. College of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243, 249 (2d Cir. 1995).
92. Davis, 74 F.3d at 1190; see supra note 69 accompanying text (stating
the Supreme Courfs mandate in North Haven Board of Education v. Bell).
93. Davis, 74 F.3d at 1193.
94. Id. at 1192 (quoting Letters of Findings by John E. Palomino, Re-
gional Civil Rights Director, Region IV, at 2 (July 24, 1992) (on file with
author)).
95. Id. at 1195.
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The Davis court stated several public policy rationales for
granting students greater protection than employees in the
workplace. First, teachers have a greater ability than employ-
ers to model and control appropriate behavior in the class-
room.96 Second, sexual harassment can cause greater damage
in the classroom than in the workplace because of the youth of
the victims and the tendency for schools to institutionalize cer-
tain behaviors if they are allowed to continue.97 Third, it is
more difficult for students to leave their school than for em-
ployees to find new employment.98 Finally, a nondiscrimina-
tory classroom is essential for proper intellectual and emo-
tional growth.99
Drawing from Title VII hostile environment liability stan-
dards, the Davis court fashioned a five-prong test. Under this
test a plaintiff must show:
(1) that [the plaintiff] is a member of a protected group; (2) that [the
plaintiff] was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) that the
harassment was based on sex; (4) that the harassment was suffi-
ciently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of [the plain-
tiffs] education and create an abusive educational environment; and
(5) that some basis for institutional liability has been established)00
Applying this test, the Davis court held that the fifth prong
of the test could be shown if the school district "knew or should
have known" of the sexual harassment and failed to take re-
medial action.''
One federal district court adopting the "knew or should
have known" standard'0 2 has attempted to reconcile its adop-




100. Id. at 1194. The Tenth Circuit recently addressed the issue of peer
sexual harassment in Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1996), and
adopted the five-prong Davis test for Title IX peer sexual harassment claims.
Id. at 1232-33. The court held, however, that Seamons failed to meet the
third element of the Davis standard, i.e., "that the harassment was based on
sex." Id. Since Seamons did not satisfy the third prong, the Tenth Circuit
declined to decide whether Title VII or intentional discrimination standards
determined school board liability. Id. at 1232 n.7.
101. Davis, 74 F.3d at 1195.
102. This opinion was issued after the court granted plaintiffs motion for
reconsideration of the court's earlier verdict. Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist.,
949 F. Supp. 1415, 1416 (N.D. Cal. 1996). The Doe court found that the adop-
tion of Title VII liability standards was appropriate in light of the significant
Title IX case law adopting Title VII substantive standards in other contexts.
Id. at 1421. The court also noted the strong public policy rationale for adopt-
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tion of Title VII standards with the requirement of intentional
discrimination in the Supreme Court's Franklin opinion. In
Doe v. Petaluma City School District,10 3 the court stated that
the Supreme Court's use of Title VII hostile environment dis-
crimination in cases following Franklin clarified the meaning
of the phrase "intentional discrimination."' °4 The Doe court
also noted that the development of Title VII case law illus-
trates that the hostile work environment cause of action is "a
species of intentional discrimination." 10 5 Therefore, the court
concluded that intentional discrimination is "established by
ing Title VII standards and the lack of any congressional intent in Title IX to
provide a lesser degree of protection to students. Id. at 1422.
The Doe court had previously held that a plaintiff seeking damages under
Title IX for peer sexual harassment must prove intentional discrimination:
"lit is not enough that the institution knew or should have known of the
hostile environment and failed to take appropriate action to end it." Doe v.
Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1571 (N.D. Cal. 1993). The
"Petaluma r court had allowed the plaintiff to prove intentional discrimina-
tion by circumstantial evidence. Id. at 1576.
103. 949 F. Supp. 1415 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
104, Id. at 1422. The Doe court began its analysis by turning to the Su-
preme Court's 1994 opinion inLandgrafv. USI Film Products, 114 S. Ct. 1483
(1994). In Landgraf, the plaintiff alleged Title VII liability for an immediate
supervisor's failure to remedy sexual harassment by a peer coworker. Id. at
1488. In determining the validity of the plaintiffs claim for monetary dam-
ages the Court examined the 1991 amendments to Title VII which preclude
the award of monetary damages in cases not involving "intentional discrimi-
nation." Id. The Doe court characterized the definition of intentional dis-
crimination in the amendments as "any form of discrimination other than 'an
employment practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact.'" Doe,
949 F. Supp. at 1422 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (1994)). The Doe court
construed the Supreme Court's discussion of the retroactivity of the 1991
amendments as an implicit recognition that hostile environment discrimina-
tion is a form of intentional discrimination. Id. The Doe court specifically
cited the Supreme Court's determination that the 1991 amendment "confers a
new right to monetary relief on persons like petitioner who were victims of a
hostile work environment but were not constructively discharged." Id.
(quoting Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1506).
105. Id. at 1422-23. The Doe court first distinguished unlawful disparate
treatment and unlawful disparate impact as the two bases for proving Title
VII violations. Id. Disparate treatment requires the proof of intentional dis-
crimination, whereas unlawful disparate impact does not. The Doe court then
concluded that the elements for Title VII liability most closely resemble dispa-
rate treatment standards. Id. at 1423. On the issue of employer liability, the
Doe court found that the Ninth Circuit courts applying the Title VII "knew or
should have known" standard of liability viewed the standard as an inten-
tional discrimination standard and not a negligence standard. Id. (citing
Equal Employment Opportunity Conm'n v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504
(9th Cir. 1989); Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., Engine Div., 797 F.2d 1417,
1421-22 (7th Cir. 1986)).
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proof of the elements required to prove the cause of action and
needs no additional proof."10 6
B. INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION THROUGH DIRECT AND
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
The majority of courts confronting the issue of peer sexual
harassment have held that plaintiffs must show that the school
intentionally discriminated against them on the basis of their
sex in order to collect monetary damages under Title IX.1 7
These courts allow the trier of fact to infer an intent to dis-
criminate from the totality of the circumstances, including evi-
dence of the "school's failure to prevent or stop the harassment
despite actual knowledge, the school's toleration of the harass-
ing behavior and the pervasiveness or severity of the harass-
ment."
108
Typically, these courts rely on Franklin in reaching the
conclusion that Title IX requires a showing of intentional dis-
crimination. For example, in Wright v. Mason City Community
School District09 the court noted that the "Supreme Court's
opinion in Franklin explicitly demands more than mere negli-
gence to create liability for monetary damages for a violation of
106. Id. at 1424 (finding that the "two elements of intent, the harasser's
intentional disparate treatment based on gender and the employer's act of
implicitly condoning that disparate treatment by knowingly failing to take
steps to remedy it, are included within the elements of hostile work environ-
ment discrimination required under Title VIP and accordingly require no ad-
ditional proof).
107. See, e.g., Wright v. Mason City Community Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp.
1412, 1419 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp.
1006, 1020 (W.D. Mo. 1995); Oona R.-S. v. Santa Rosa City Sch., 890 F. Supp.
1452, 1463-65 (N.D. Cal. 1995). The Northern District Court of Iowa also ad-judicated a peer sexual harassment case under the requirement of intentional
discrimination. Burrow v. Postville Community Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193
(N.D. Iowa 1996). In Burrow, however, the plaintiff conceded that she must
prove intent to discriminate and the court accordingly assumed that intent
was required, while reserving final judgment for a later time. Id. at 1205.
108. Burrow, 929 F. Supp. at 1204; see also Bosley, 904 F. Supp. at 1020
(holding that discriminatory intent does not "require proof that unlawful dis-
crimination is the sole purpose behind each act of the defendant .... It is,
rather, the cumulative evidence of action and inaction which objectively mani-
fests discriminatory intent."); Oona, 890 F. Supp. at 1469 ("Such discrimina-
tion may manifest itself in the active encouragement of peer harassment, the
toleration of harassing behavior of male students, or the failure to take ade-
quate steps to deter or punish peer harassment.").
109. 940 F. Supp. 1412 (N.D. Iowa 1996).
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Title IX-it requires plaintiffs to show an intent to discrimi-
nate."n1 0
These courts also address Franklin's use of Title VII case
law. In Bosley v. Kearney R-1 School District,1 ' the court,
noting Franklin's reliance on Meritor, held that Title VII case
law should provide the remaining substantive elements for a
Title IX sexually hostile environment claim.1 2 These courts
accordingly adjust the elements for hostile environment sexual
harassment under Title VII to reflect its determination that
Franklin requires a showing of intentional discrimination.
13
C. DISPARATE TREATmENT LIABILITY
In Rowinsky v. Bryan Independent School District,n1 4 the
Fifth Circuit rejected the "knew or should have known" stan-
dard and found that a Title IX plaintiff seeking to establish li-
ability for failure to remedy peer sexual harassment must
prove that the school district directly discriminated by re-
sponding to the harassment differently based on the sex of the
victim." 5 Unlike the Eleventh Circuit, the Fifth Circuit con-
strued the issue of peer sexual harassment as a broader ques-
tion of whether courts can hold a recipient of federal grant
money liable for the sexually discriminatory conduct of a party
other than the recipient or the recipient's agent.11 6 The Rowin-
110. Id. at 1419. The Northern District Court of California in Oona like-
wise concluded that the Franklin decision required a showing of intentional
discrimination. 890 F. Supp. at 1465. In determining the meaning of the
Franklin decision, the Oona court specifically relied upon the manner in
which the Franklin court used Pennhurst to distinguish intentional from un-
intentional discrimination. Id.
111. 904 F. Supp. 1006 (W.D. Mo. 1995).
112. Id. at 1022 ("Franklin supports the conclusion that Title VII law pro-
vides standards for enforcing the anti-discrimination provisions of Title IX.").
The Bosley court noted that this holding was consistent with the Supreme
Courfs command to accord Title IX a broad sweep, as well as with the trend
in federal courts to use Title VII in analyzing Title IX claims and with the in-
structions of the EEOC guidelines to "consider Title VII standards in deter-
mining whether an employer has violated Title IX Id.
113. Id. at 1023 (requiring proof that 'the school district knew of the har-
assment and intentionally failed to take proper remedial action"). The Wright
and Burrow courts adopted the same five-prong standard. Wright v. Mason
City Community Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 1412, 1419 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Burrow
v. Postville Community Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193, 1205-06 (N.D. Iowa
1996).
114. 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 156 (1996).
115. Id. at 1016.
116. Id. at 1010. The Rowinsky court subsequently rejected the proposi-
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sky court found that while the text of Title IX was ambiguous
as to the conduct of third parties, the scope, 117 structure,118 leg-
islative history,119 and agency interpretation by the OCR1 20 all
indicated that Title IX liability exists when grant recipients or
their agents discriminate on the basis of sex.121 Accordingly,
the Rowinsky court held that a Title IX plaintiff seeking to es-
tablish liability for failure to prevent peer sexual harassment
must show discrimination based on sex. 122
The Fifth Circuit also found that the word "discrimination"
in Title IX could not be read to include hostile environment
sexual harassment in the case of peer sexual harassment by
students, because a theory of discrimination fashioned for the
adult workplace is inappropriate for a situation involving chil-
tion that a student might be considered an agent of the school. Id. at 1010-11
n.9.
117. The Rowinsky court stated that the scope of Title IX is limited to
grant recipients because Congress enacted Title IX under its Spending Clause
powers. Id. at 1012. While the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that the Supreme
Court has left the issue open, it nonetheless concluded that three factors
strongly suggest that Title IX is a Spending Clause statute. Id. at 1012 n.14.
First, Title IX was modeled after Title VI, a Spending Clause statute, and
should be given the same construction. Id. Second, the statute regulates
purely private academic institutions. Id. Finally, the Supreme Court will not
attribute congressional intent to act under the Fourteenth Amendment, un-
less it expressly indicates it is doing so. Id. at 1012-13 n.14 (citing Pennhurst
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 16 (1981)).
Based on the conclusion that Title IX is a Spending Clause statute, the
Rowinsky court held that liability exists only for the acts of grant recipients
and their agents. Noting that the "value of a spending condition is that it will
induce the grant recipient to comply with the requirement in order to get the
needed finds," id. at 1013, the Rowinsky court reasoned that "[in order for
the coercion to be effective, the likelihood of violating the prohibition cannot
be too great." Id. Imposing liability for the acts of third parties would destroy
the effectiveness of the, spending condition because grant recipients have
minimal control over third party actions. Id.
118. The Rowinsky court noted that with the exception of one phrase, the
statute exclusively discusses discrimination by grant recipients. Id.
119. The Fifth Circuit quoted numerous speeches by Senator Bayh, the
statute's sponsor, which list the purposes of Title IX. Id. at 1014. The court
noted that all of the purposes concerned the acts of grant recipients. Id.
120. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (quoting the OCR Policy
Memorandum). The Rowinsky court explicitly stated that the OCR Letters of
Finding which were used by the Davis court should be accorded little weight
because the letters "do not reflect the deliberate consideration of a rulemaking
proceeding." Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1015 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 165 (1996).
121. Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1012-16.
122. Id. at 1016 (specifying that "a school district might violate Title IX if




dren.123  Moreover, the court stated that all Title VII cases
finding liability for harassment by third parties were inappli-
cable to the case of peer student harassment because the Title
VII cases always involved the "power of the employer." 24
III. TITLE VII VS. INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION: THE
TWO HEADS OF TITLE IX
While courts facing peer sexual harassment have naturally
turned to Title VII case law, they must recognize that "Title
VII jurisprudence is a guide, and... court[s] should not blindly
apply Title VII to determine the issues raised in a Title IX
case."125 Federal courts must look to both Title VII hostile en-
vironment case law and Title VI intentional discrimination re-
quirements in fashioning an appropriate and legally sound
remedy for victims of peer sexual harassment. This Note pro-
poses that a student plaintiff seeking to hold a school district
liable under Title IX for failing to remedy peer sexual harass-
ment must show that the educational institution knew of the
harassment and intentionally failed to take the proper reme-
dial measures because of the plaintiffs sex.126
123. Id. at 1011 n.11. The court explained that the "problem with sexual
harassment is 'the unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the impo-
sition of unequal power.'" Id. (quoting CATHERINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 1 (1979)). The court then argued that the
only unequal power relationship in a school is the relationship between the
school and the student. Since no unequal power situation exists, "[unwanted
sexual advances of fellow students do not carry the same coercive effect or
abuse of power as those made by a teacher, employer or co-worker." Id.
124. Id. The Rowinsky court specifically stated that the plaintiff could not
rely on Franklin to establish the proposition that sexual harassment by stu-
dents may be attributed to the school board. Id. The court noted that sexual
harassment by a teacher involves the power of the employer because the
teacher is an agent of the grant recipient. Id.
125. Schofield ex rel. Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F.
Supp. 162, 170 (N.D.N.Y. 1996).
126. Before reaching the basis for institutional -liability, federal courts
must first determine whether Title IX recognizes a claim for the unique
situation of peer hostile environment sexual harassment, and whether the
plaintiff has proven the first four elements of the hostile environment sexual
harassment standard. The specific legal and policy issues in these two steps
fall outside the scope of this Note. In general, district and circuit courts ad-
dressing the issue of liability for student sexual harassment have-with the
exception of the Fifth Circuit-concluded that the school district has potential
liability in some form for peer sexual harassment. Most courts and commen-
tators have rejected the Fifth Circuits approach on the grounds that it incor-
rectly focuses on the conduct of the harassing students, instead of the actions
or inactions of the school district and its agents. See, e.g., Doe v. Petaluma
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A. COURTS THAT APPLY TITLE VII STANDARDS MISINTERPRET
TITLE VII CASE LAW
Federal courts adopting Title Vi's "knew or should have
known" standard for liability rely on the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Franklin, the Court's directive to accord Title IX a
sweep as broad as its language, and agency interpretations by
the OCR.12 These sources, however, do not support the adop-
tion of Title VII liability standards. Federal courts and com-
mentators relying on these sources have either misread or
overstated their significance in applying Title vIrs broad li-
ability standard.
1. Title VII Courts Misinterpret the Relationship Between
Franklin and Meritor
Typically, courts cite the Supreme Court's opinion in
Franklin as the primary rationale for adopting Title VII stan-
dards in Title IX peer sexual harassment cases.128 The Frank-
City Sch. Dist., 949 F. Supp. 1415, 1421 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (finding that the
Fifth Circuit fundamentally misunderstood the nature of the peer sexual har-
assment claim because "[tjhe actual thrust of this type of claim, is to impose
liability on the school district based not on the harassing conduct of its stu-
dents, but on the district's own conduct of knowingly permitting the discrimi-
natory hostile and abusive environment to continue"); see also Recent Case,
Sexual Harassment-Title 1X-Fifth Circuit Holds School District Not Liable
for Student-to-Student Sexual Harassment-Rowinsky v. Bryan Independent
School District, 110 HARV. L. REV. 787, 792 (1996) (claiming that the Fifth
Circuit's three justifications for denying school liability actually support find-
ing school liability for the acts of third parties in peer sexual harassment
cases).
Furthermore, the Rowinsky court's standard of liability yields results at
odds with fundamental anti-sex discrimination principles. Under the Rowin-
sky approach, a school district can avoid liability as long as boys and girls are
treated equally. This would mean that schools could avoid liability by ignor-
ing all student harassment. In a school where only harassment against girls
existed, the school could intentionally discriminate against girls by ignoring
their protests and still avoid liability. Such a standard runs contrary to Title
IX, which seeks to prevent all sex discrimination in educational institutions.
127. See, e.g., supra part II.A (describing the Davis court's reliance on the
Franklin opinion, the Supreme Court's mandate, and the OCR Letters of
Finding).
128. See supra note 91 and accompanying text (noting the Eleventh and
Second Circuit's citation to Franklin). Commentators also point to Franklin
as grounds for adopting Title VII liability standards in Title IX peer sexual
harassment cases. See, e.g., Elizabeth J. Gant, Comment, Applying Title VII
"Hostile Work Environment" Analysis to Title IX of the Education Amend-
ments of 1972: An Avenue of Relief for Victims of Student-To-Student Harass-
ment in the Schools, 98 DICK. L. REV. 489, 506 (1994) (finding the Supreme
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lin opinion, however, cannot be read to sanction the adoption of
Title VII hostile environment sexual harassment standards be-
cause the school's liability in that case rested on agency prin-
ciples, not "knew or should have known" liability. Federal
courts claiming that Franklin adopted Title VII standards
point to the Court's citation of Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.
Vinson,12 9 which served as the basis for finding that the
teacher's conduct constituted sexual harassment.130  Upon
closer examination, however, the phrase taken from Meritor
does not compel, or even suggest, an adoption of Title VII li-
ability standards.
The Franklin Court quoted Meritor for the proposition that
"when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of
the subordinate's sex, that supervisor discriminates on the ba-
sis of sex."13 1 The Meritor Court made this statement in de-
termining whether the plaintiff had been sexually harassed at
all, not when determining the employer's liability. 32 Accord-
ingly, the statement relates to the existence of the second
prong of the hostile environment sexual harassment claim,
whether the plaintiff was subjected to unwelcome sexual har-
assment, and not the fifth prong, the basis of institutional li-
ability. In the context of the Franklin opinion, therefore, the
statement taken from Meritor stands for the unremarkable
proposition that by sexually harassing Christine Franklin, the
teacher himself engaged in sex discrimination.
The statements made by the Franklin Court following the
quote from Meritor further support the determination that the
Court did not invoke or adopt Title VII liability standards. Af-
ter determining that the teacher engaged in sex discrimina-
tion, the Court did not apply any existing Title VII liability
standard to find the school board liable.133 While the facts in
Franklin supported Title VII liability because the plaintiff al-
leged that teachers and administrators actually knew of the
harassment,13 4 the Court did not refer to that information
Court's opinion in Franklin justifies the extension of Title VII "knew or should
have known" liability standards).
129. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
130. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (describing the Franklin
Court's citation to Meritor).
131. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992).
132. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64.
133. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75.
134. Id. at 63-64.
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when it characterized the plaintiffs claim as one for inten-
tional discrimination.'35
The Franklin Court's refusal to mention or adopt Title VII
standards suggests that the Court used an alternative princi-
ple to find the school liable for the intentional acts of the
teacher. The Court did not mention the actions of anyone other
than the teacher in finding intentional discrimination, indicat-
ing that the Court found the school liable on the basis of
agency principles. 36 Because the teacher was an agent of the
school, the school was liable for his actions. The Franklin
opinion, therefore, does not support Title VII liability stan-
dards as a basis for institutional liability in Title IX actions.
2. Title VII Courts Misinterpret Supreme Court Precedent on
Title IX's Scope
Federal courts adopting Title VII liability standards have
also misstated the importance of the Supreme Court's directive
to accord Title IX "a sweep as broad as its language." The Su-
preme Court directed courts to give Title IX a sweep as broad
as its language in the context of determining what parties
would fall within the scope of the statute. 37 When the Court
turned to analyze other Title IX concerns in the case, it did not
apply the directive. 3 In the peer sexual harassment context,
therefore, the Supreme Court's directive dictates that courts
consider students a protected class under Title IX. The direc-
tive, however, does not speak to what standard of institutional
liability the courts should adopt. Therefore, courts must not
read the Supreme Court's dictate as advocating Title VII liabil-
ity standards.
3. Title VII Courts Misinterpret Agency Interpretation
Finally, courts have overstated the significance of the
OCR's interpretations on the subject of sexual harassment in
135. Id. at 75.
136. See Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1575 (N.D.
Cal. 1993) (concluding that the Franklin Court held the school liable because
of agency principles, not Title VII liability standards).
137. See Northhaven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 520-22 (1982)
(giving Title IX an expansive scope by recognizing that the word "person" en-
compasses employees, as well as students, of federally funded education pro-
grams).
138. See id. at 535-40 (analyzing whether regulations promulgated under
Title IX needed to be program-specific without adopting a sweeping mode of
statutory interpretation used to determine scope).
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general, and peer sexual harassment in particular. Several
courts cite OCR interpretations as support for a "knew or
should have known" liability standard in Title IX peer sexual
harassment cases. 39 The OCR Policy Memorandum, 4 ' the
"most definitive statement by the OCR on sexual harass-
ment,"'41 left the issue of Title IX grant recipient liability for
student peer sexual harassment unresolved. 42 The Policy
Memorandum, therefore, does not compel Title VII standards.
The only OCR documents which address peer sexual har-
assment are two sets of Letters of Finding by regional offices.14 1
These OCR Letters of Finding state that educational institu-
tions should be held liable for peer sexual harassment under
Title VII standards.'" These documents, however, do not com-
pel Title VII liability. Letters of Finding do not deserve the
same degree of judicial deference as official policy regulations
because they are not the product of an agency rule-making de-
cision.'45 Furthermore, as the Fifth Circuit observed, the pur-
pose of the Letters of Finding is to "compel voluntary compli-
ance by an offending institution."146  This fact is crucial,
because the Letters of Finding by the OCR regional offices "do
not address what private judicial remedies are available under
Title IX "147 Indeed, a standard of liability for school districts
139. See, e.g., supra note 94 and accompanying text (stating the Davis
court's reliance on an OCR Letter of Finding in holding that Title VII stan-
dards should apply).
140. See OCR Policy Memorandum, supra note 65, at 10 (defining "sexual
harassment").
141. Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1015 (5th Cir.
1996).
142. See OCR Policy Memorandum, supra note 65, at 10 (leaving unre-
solved the issue of a recipient's liability for "sexual harassment acts of stu-
dents against fellow students in the context of the situation in which neither
student is in a position of authority, derived from the institution, over the
other students").
143. Letters of Findings by Kenneth A. Mines, Regional Civil Rights Direc-
tor, Region V (April 27, 1993) (on file with author); Letters of Findings by
John E. Palomino, Regional Civil Rights Director, Region IV (July 24, 1992)
(on file with author).
144. See supra text accompanying note 94 (quoting 1992 Letters of Find-
ings which proposes Title VII liability standards).
145. See supra note 120 (noting the Fifth Circuit's determination that
agency decisions which are not the product of official rule-making processes
do not merit as much judicial deference).
146. Rwinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1015 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 165 (1996).
147. Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560,1573 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
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may be appropriate for certain types of relief, such as volun-
tary compliance, and not for others, such as private damages. 4 '
As the Supreme Court stated, "Whether a litigant has a cause
of action 'is analytically distinct and prior to the question of
what relief, if any, a litigant may be entitled to receive.'"' 49
Since neither the Franklin decision, the Supreme Court's di-
rective, nor OCR interpretations support Title VII standards,
federal courts adopting 'new or should have known" liability
standards incorrectly interpret the law governing Title IX.
4. Title VII "Knew or Should Have Known" Liability Does Not
Constitute Proof of Intentional Discrimination
Federal Courts also should not attempt to circumvent legal
precedent by finding that Title VII liability standards consti-
tute proof of intentional discrimination. The majority of fed-
eral courts addressing the issue of school liability for peer sex-
ual harassment characterize Title VII "knew or should have
known" standards as distinct from intentional discrimina-
tion. 50 In Doe, however, the Northern District Court of Cali-
fornia found that the Title VII liability standard actually devel-
oped as a species of intentional discrimination and accordingly
met the requirements of Franklin.5'
The Doe court correctly determined that hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment claims developed as a species of dis-
parate treatment violations which require proof of intentional
discrimination. The court, however, entirely missed the fact
that these claims function as disparate treatment claims be-
cause of the intentional discrimination committed by the har-
assing parties, not the conduct of the employer/institution who
"should have known" of the harassment and failed to provide a
148. Title X's status as a Spending Clause statute imposes different stan-
dards of proof according to the type of remedy sought. See infra notes 174-179
and accompanying text (stating that Title IX plaintiffs can only seek monetary
damages if they allege intentional discrimination).
149. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of New York, 463 U.S. 582,
595 (1983) (quoting Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 (1979)).
150. See, e.g., Schofield ex rel. Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist.,
935 F. Supp. 162, 173 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating that the constructive notice
prong, or the "should have known" element of the Title VII test is a negligence
standard); Burrow v. Postville Community Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193, 1206
(N.D. Iowa 1996) (distinguishing Title VII standards from a higher standard
of actual knowledge).
151. See supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text (summarizing the




remedy. In reaching this decision, however, the Doe court im-
properly relied on several circuit court cases.
The court first relied on Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corpora-
tion, Engine Division,152 in which the Seventh Circuit stated
that a "failure to take reasonable steps to prevent" racial har-
assment would make the employer liable if management level
employees "knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should
have known, about the campaign of harassment."153 The Sev-
enth Circuit indicated, however, that "knew or should have
known" liability is different from intentional discrimination.
The Hunter court consistently referred to the responsibility of
the employer to exercise reasonable care under the circum-
stances. 154 A reasonable care standard reflects a standard
based on negligence principles, not intentional discrimination.
In fact, the court explicitly labeled the defendant's liability as
deriving from its "negligence" in not addressing racial dis-
crimination directed at the plaintiff by his coworkers.' 55
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit explicitly stated that the
behavior it found intentional was the racial harassment by
Hunter's coworkers, not the failures of the employer. The court
defined racial harassment as an intentional wrong and stated
that the doctrine of respondeat superior makes "an employer
liable for those intentional wrongs of his employees that are
committed in furtherance of the employment." The court fur-
ther noted that the "tortfeasing employee must think... that
he is doing the employer's business in committing the wrong."156
Doe then relied on Henson v. City of Dundee,157 an Elev-
enth Circuit opinion that also compels a reading contrary to
the interpretation of the Doe court. The Doe court cited Hen-
152. 797 F.2d 1417 (7th Cir. 1986). The case addressed racial discrimina-
tion in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994). Hunter, 797 F.2d at 1420. In per-
tinent part, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides that "[a]ll persons ... shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts.., as
is enjoyed by white citizens." Courts have interpreted 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to
forbid racial discrimination in employment. Hunter, 797 F.2d at 1420.
Hunter also brought a claim under Title VII, but the judge declined to enterjudgment on this count, stating she "would have reached the same result on
the Title VII charge" as the jury did on the § 1981 charge. Id. at 1421.
153. Hunter, 797 F.2d at 1421.
154. Id. at 1421-22 (e.g., "in the exercise of reasonable care"; "could have
prevented by reasonable care"; "[t]he employer's liability thus is not strict...
his only duty is to act reasonably in the circumstances").
155. Id. at 1422 (emphasis added).
156. Id. at 1421-22 (emphasis added).
157. 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
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son's treatment of hostile environment harassment claims as
disparate treatment claims that require intentional discrimi-
nation. 58 The Doe court, however, missed the fact that Henson
discussed intentional discrimination in the context of the third
prong of Title VII's hostile environment sexual harassment
standard, which deals with harassment based on sex.159 In so
doing, the Henson court made clear that hostile environment
sexual harassment claims are disparate treatment claims be-
cause of the harassing party's intentional decision to discrimi-
nate on the basis of sex, not the employer's failure to remedy
the harassment when it "should have known" of its existence.
Finally, Doe relied on a Third Circuit decision that likewise
defined only the act of the perpetrator as intentional discrimi-
nation. 6 The Third Circuit explained, "The intent to discrimi-
nate on the basis of sex in cases involving sexual propositions,
innuendo, pornographic materials, or sexual derogatory lan-
guage is implicit, and thus should be recognized as a matter of
course."
161
The holdings of these three cases reveal that while Title
VII hostile environment sexual harassment claims may be a
species of intentional discrimination, the "knew or should have
known" standard for employer liability remains a negligence
standard. The Doe court erred by holding that this standard
met Title IX's requirement that the educational institution in-
tentionally discriminated on the basis of sex when it "knew or
should have known" of the peer sexual harassment and failed
to provide a remedy.
B. THE INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION STANDARD IS
CONSISTENT WITH LEGAL PRECEDENT
1. Title IX Is a Spending Clause Statute
Because existing legal precedent does not require Title IX
to reflect Title VII liability standards, federal courts should
look to Title IX's status as a Spending Clause statute to de-
termine the appropriate standard for institutional liability.
When courts determine the power under which Congress en-
158. Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 949 F. Supp. 1415, 1423 (N.D. Cal.
1996).
159. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982).
160. Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990).
161. Id. at 1482 n.3.
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acted legislation they choose between "Congress' power to en-
force the Fourteenth Amendment and its power under the
Spending Clause to place conditions on the grant of federal
funds."162 Although the Supreme Court in Franklin refused to
determine whether Congress acted pursuant to its Spending
Clause powers in enacting Title ]X,163 closer examination re-
veals that Title IX is a Spending Clause statute.16
Congress intentionally drafted Title IX after Title VI, pro-
viding in Title IX's provisions that Title VI regulations should
be incorporated into Title IX. 65 Like Title VI regulations, Title
IX requires federally funded institutions to conform with its
prohibition on certain categories of discrimination. 66 A con-
tractual relationship between the grant recipient and the fed-
eral government evinces that Title IX functions as a Spending
Clause statute. 6 7 Since Title VI and Title IX function through
similar contractual regulations, courts should interpret Title
IX as a Spending Clause statute.
Furthermore, construing Title IX as a statute enacted pur-
suant to the Fourteenth Amendment would limit Title IX's
scope to schools receiving state funding. The Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment operates exclusively as a
restriction on a "Isitate or ... those acting under color of its
authority."168 In contrast, "actions of the Federal Government
and its officers are beyond the purview" of the Fourteenth
Amendment.1 69 This distinction is important for assessing Title
Xs applicability to private educational institutions because
while the "receipt of state funding may transform a private
162. Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 15 (1981).
163. See supra note 117 (citing the Fifth Circuit's determination that the
Supreme Court has reserved the issue of whether Title IX is a Spending
Clause statute).
164. The Fifth Circuit in Rowinsky correctly determined that Congress en-
acted Title IX under the Spending Clause statute rather than § 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment. See supra note 117 (summarizing the grounds on which
the Rowinsky court found that Congress passed Title IX pursuant to its
Spending Clause powers).
165. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (stating Congress's intent
that Title VI and Title IX be similarly construed).
166. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (quoting the operative lan-
guage of Title IX).
167. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (stating that Spending
Power statutes function as a contract between the grant recipient and the
government).
168. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418,423 (1972).
169. Id. at 424.
1997] 1299
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
school into a state actor for Fourteenth Amendment purposes,
the receipt of federal funds does not make a private school a
state actor."170 Accordingly, any attempt to find Title IX liabil-
ity for a private school which receives federal, but not state
funds, would "push the limits of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."
171
Finally, construing Title IX as a Fourteenth Amendment
statute runs contrary to general norms of statutory interpreta-
tion. Courts seldom find that Congress intended to act under
its authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment "[blecause
such legislation imposes congressional policy on a State invol-
untarily, and because it often intrudes on traditional state
authority. 2 Because nothing in Title IX itself or its legisla-
tive history evidences a congressional intent to act under its
Fourteenth Amendment powers, courts should interpret Title
IX as a Spending Clause statute.173
2. Plaintiffs Seeking Damages Under Spending Clause
Statutes Must Show Intentional Discrimination
In Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Commission of New
York, the Supreme Court found that monetary remedies are
available for intentional violations of a Spending Clause stat-
ute.174 The Franklin Court agreed and held that a private
damages remedy exists under Title IX for intentional discrimi-
nation.175 A Title IX plaintiff, therefore, can recover monetary
damages when a school district fails to remedy peer sexual
harassment and the school intentionally discriminates on the
basis of sex.
170. Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1012 n.14 (5th Cir.
1996).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1012-13 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,
451 U.S. 1, 16 (1981)).
173. Id. at 1013 n.14.
174. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (summarizing the opinion of
the Guardians Court majority that monetary remedies were available for in-
tentional violations of Title VI). While the Supreme Court's opinion in
Guardians lacked a majority opinion, the Franklin Court noted that "a clear
majority [of the Guardian Court] expressed the view that damages were
available under Title VI in an action seeking remedies for an intentional vio-
lation." Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 70 (1992).
175. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text (distinguishing inten-
tional from unintentional violations of Title IX).
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The principles formulated in Pennhurst, Guardians, and
Franklin, however, deny a plaintiff monetary damages when a
school does not intentionally discriminate on the basis of sex.
176
Under Pennhurst and Guardians, judicial remedies for viola-
tions of Spending Clause statutes must allow grant recipients
to comply with additional obligations found by the court or
terminate its receipt of federal funds. 17 The Franklin Court
correctly observes that a grant recipient cannot be liable for an
unintentional violation of a Spending Clause statute because
the grant recipient "lacks notice that it will be liable for a
176. Commentators writing on use of Title IX to combat peer sexual har-
assment in schools have failed to address the role of Spending Clause prece-
dent when exploring the proper basis for institutional liability. The over-
whelming majority of commentators fail to mention the relevance of Spending
Clause precedent at all. See Bodnar, supra note 47, at 567 (proposing to
amend Title IX to address more appropriately peer sexual harassment with-
out addressing Spending Clause power issues); Charlie James Harris, Jr.,
Message to the Judiciary: The Proper Application of Title IX May Save Our
Children, 63 UMKC L. REV. 429, 449-53 (1995) (proposing a pari materia
adoption of Title VII principles without discussing Spending Clause prece-
dent); Carrie Baker, Comment, Proposed Title IX Guidelines on Sex-Based
Harassment of Students, 43 EMORY L.J. 271, 307-08 (1994) (adopting Title VII
liability standards for peer sexual harassment without discussing Spending
Clause principles); Gant, supra note 128, at 513-16 (settling on Title VII liabil-
ity as a compromise between strict liability and no liability, but failing to con-
sider intentional discrimination as an option); Sherer, supra note 11, at 2122
(adopting "knew or should have known" liability after failing to discuss
Spending Clause power limitations on Title IX).
Commentators that have addressed Spending Clause principles have not
disputed the intentional discrimination precedent set by Pennhurst, Guardi-
ans, and Franklin, but rather have attempted to circumvent its impact on Ti-
tle IX, and in the process, ignored the contractual principles underlying the
legal precedent. See Miller, supra note 27, at 717-20 (relying on agency inter-
pretation by the OCR and lack of clear congressional intent to remedy
Guardians' requirement of intentional discrimination); Eriksson, supra note
23, at 1813-17 (attempting to distinguish Guardians on stare decisis, imple-
menting regulations, and public policy grounds). One commentator advocat-
ing an intentional discrimination standard cited Guardians and Franklin but
failed to discuss the underlying reason why Spending Clause statutes require
proof of intentional discrimination for monetary liability. See Rinestine, su-
pra note 64, at 822-23 (summarizing the Doe I court's opinion that Guardians
and Franklin required intentional discrimination). As of the date of this Note,
the only other commentator to advocate an intentional discrimination stan-
dard relied solely on policy rationale and failed to mention controlling Spend-
ing Clause precedent. See Sylvia Hermann Bukoffsky, Note, School District
Liability for Student-Inflicted Sexual Harassment: School Administrators
Learn a Lesson Under Title X, 42 WAYNE L. REv. 171, 192-93 (1995)
(advocating an intentional discrimination standard for Title IX peer sexual
harassment cases).




monetary award."17 8 The grant recipient lacks notice because
unintentional violations do not inform the recipient that it
"had been violating the federal standards."" 9
The grant recipient, however, is liable for intentional vio-
lations of the statute because it violated part of the funding re-
quirements of which the grant recipient was aware when it
contracted with Congress. When the grant recipient inten-
tionally violates the clear requirements of the federal funding,
it has full notice of the obligations it holds and, therefore,
should not be accorded the opportunity to reassess its costs.
The Franklin opinion noted that Title IX "unquestionably"
placed a duty on schools not to discriminate on the basis of
sex. 8 ' Therefore, a Title IX plaintiff must show that the school
intentionally discriminated on the basis of sex in order to ob-
tain compensatory relief.
3. Showing Intentional Discrimination Through Direct and
Circumstantial Evidence Is Consistent with Title IX
Precedent
While a plaintiff seeking damages for a school's failure to
remedy peer sexual harassment must prove that the school in-
tentionally discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of
sex, federal courts should allow plaintiffs to meet that burden
by direct and circumstantial evidence. Several federal district
courts presently allow plaintiffs to prove intentional discrimi-
nation on the basis of sex by the totality of evidence.' Cir-
cumstantial evidence of intent fulfills the plaintiffs burden
under Title IX because the behavior used as circumstantial
evidence proves intentional discrimination and public policy
supports a broad understanding of intentional discrimination.
The courts that allow circumstantial evidence infer inten-
tional discrimination if the school knew of the harassment and
actively encouraged the harassment, tolerated harassing be-
havior, or failed to take adequate steps to deter or punish
178. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 74 (1992).
179. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of New York, 463 U.S. 582,
598 (1983).
180. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75.
181. See supra notes 107-110 and accompanying text (discussing the
Wright, Burrow, and Oona holdings).
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known peer harassment. 182 In order to reach the issue of insti-
tutional liability, a court must first determine that the sexual
harassment experienced by the plaintiff was severe enough to
alter the condition of the plaintiffs education.183 Sexual har-
assment of this magnitude denies the plaintiff the benefits of
education on the basis of the plaintiffs sex. If a school has
knowledge of sexual harassment and encourages the harass-
ment, tolerates the harassment, or otherwise refuses to act, it
makes an intentional choice to let the discrimination continue.
This intentional choice sanctions discrimination based on sex.
Sanctioning discrimination based on sex contradicts Franklin,
which stated that "Congress surely did not intend for federal
moneys to be expended to support the intentional actions it
sought by statute to proscribe."184 Circumstantial evidence of
intent, therefore, establishes the school's intentional decision
to discriminate on the basis of sex in violation of Title IX.
Furthermore, public policy supports the use of circum-
stantial evidence to prove intentional discrimination. If courts
required a plaintiff to show intentional discrimination apart
from circumstantial evidence, the plaintiff would have to pro-
vide statements, documents or some other form of evidence
which directly implicated the school in a plan to discriminate
against the plaintiff on the basis of his or her sex. This burden
of proof, similar to that required by the Fifth Circuit,185 would
have the effect of rendering Title IX useless for most victims of
peer sexual harassment. 186 Schools could escape liability by
dismissing all peer sexual harassment claims or carefully
avoiding statements that indicated the school's decisions to ig-
nore student's complaints were based on their gender. Such a
policy would render students powerless to hold indifferent or
182. See Burrow v. Postville Community Sch. Dist, 929 F. Supp. 1193,
1204 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (stating the factors used by the court to prove inten-
tional discrimination under the circumstantial evidence approach).
183. The severity requirement is enforced by the fourth prong of the peer
hostile environment sexual harassment standard. See supra text accompany-
ing note 100 (quoting the standard adopted by the Eleventh Circuit).
184. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992).
185. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (stating the evidence re-
quired by the Fifth Circuit).
186. See Eriksson, supra note 23, at 1816 (observing that "a traditional in-
tent requirement would force a victim to prove that school officials intended
for boys to harass girls and deliberately encouraged this result" and conclud-
ing that such a standard would "handcuff a victim of sexual harassment").
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abusive schools liable and would frustrate the guiding purpose
of Title IX.
Allowing circumstantial evidence of intentional discrimi-
nation also balances the competing interests of Title IX student
plaintiffs and our nation's schools. Requiring proof of intent
makes a Title IX claim for peer sexual harassment more diffi-
cult to prove, but allowing circumstantial evidence of intent
enables students to hold accountable schools which would
rather turn a deaf ear to their plight. This compromise retains
Title IX's effectiveness as a means of combating peer sexual
harassment without overly prejudicing either party in the
court system.
C. THE INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION STANDARD Is
PREFERABLE FOR PUBLIC POLICY REASONS
In addition to the fact that the intentional discrimination
standard better conforms to the requirements of legal prece-
dent, it also is preferable for public policy reasons. Advocates
of "knew or should have known" liability often point to the
public policy rationale as a primary reason for adopting Title
VII standards." 7 Admittedly, the Title VII liability standard
operates as a more pro-plaintiff standard than the intentional
discrimination standard and better forces schools to take a
proactive stance on the problem of peer sexual harassment.'
Nonetheless, significant public policy arguments support the
adoption of an intentional discrimination standard. Concerns
about protecting schools from unnecessary liability, fostering
supportive ties between school officials and students, and rec-
ognizing the differences between school and employment set-
tings militate against adopting Title VII liability standards on
the basis of public policy.
187. See, e.g., Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1189(11th Cir.), reh'g granted and opinion vacated, 91 F.3d 1418 (11th Cir. 1996)(advancing four policy reasons for adopting Title VII standards); Miller, supra
note 27, at 721-22 (arguing that the uniqueness of the educational environ-
ment supports adopting Title VII standards as a matter of public policy).
188. Because liability can attach when the school "knew or should have
known" of the harassment, the Title VII standard forces schools consistently
to reevaluate what conduct constitutes peer sexual harassment and to enact
and enforce policies which are designed to detect and address peer sexual
harassment at the earliest possible stages. The Title VII standard, therefore,
forces schools proactively to address peer sexual harassment and creates a
pro-plaintiff burden of proof when they do not.
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The most common criticism of expanding school liability
under Title IX is the potential for exposing our nation's poorly
financed schools to additional litigation expenses and mone-
tary damage awards.8 9 Courts concerned about schools' fi-
nancial capabilities to carry out their educational missions
should adopt a liability standard which guarantees that
schools will have an opportunity to address a sexual harass-
ment problem before being found liable. Title VII liability does
not absolutely guarantee this opportunity.
The Title VH "knew or should have known" standard ap-
plies an actual and constructive notice standard for determin-
ing liability. Constructive notice, the "should have known"
standard, "is a substitute for actual notice and will be found to
exist 'where a defective condition has existed for such a length
of time that knowledge thereof should have been acquired in
the exercise of reasonable care.'"'19  While most of the peer
sexual harassment cases tried under Title VII "knew or should
have known" liability standards involve actual notice, 9' it is
possible for a student plaintiff to proceed entirely on construc-
tive notice grounds.'92 In these few cases, the "knew or should
have known" liability standard would penalize schools that
may have taken steps to remedy the peer sexual harassment.
In contrast, the intentional discrimination standard requires
actual notice in all cases, thereby guaranteeing that schools
have the opportunity to address the harassment before being
found monetarily liable. As a result of its ability to limit mone-
tary liability, the intentional discrimination standard best re-
sponds to the most persuasive criticism of expanding Title IX
liability.
189. Eriksson, supra note 23, at 1817-18.
190. Schofield ex rel. Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F.
Supp. 162, 173 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (quoting Fiorella v. Caleminis, 1996 WL
288471, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept 12, 1996)).
191. See, e.g., Davis, 74 F.3d at 1189 (stating that the plaintiff and her
parents had continually complained to school officials before bringing suit
against the school district).
192. The Supreme Court explicitly recognized this possibility when it de-
termined that under Title VII, the "absence of notice to an employer does not
necessarily insulate that employer from liability." Meritor Say. Bank v. Vin-
son, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986). Furthermore, the efforts made by the Northern
District Court of New York to limit Title IX liability to instances of actual no-
tice after it had adopted Title VII standards would not make sense unless a
plaintiff could proceed on constructive notice grounds alone. See supra note
88 (summarizing the holding of the Bruneau court).
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. By requiring a student victim to first notify school officials,
the courts can make sure that the primary responsibility to
combat peer sexual harassment stays with schools and not the
courts. Allocating this duty to the schools will further encour-
age better relationships between schools, parents, and stu-
dents. A standard that requires students to first notify the
school of peer sexual harassment mandates that students use
available school resources. By encouraging students to use
these resources, the intentional discrimination standard helps
to create a supportive academic community. Moreover, should
school officials fail to respond adequately to students' reports of
peer sexual harassment, students still may seek a remedy at
court. Because the Title VII standard allows students in some
circumstances to sue without first turning to teachers or coun-
seling staff, it runs the risk of creating a suspicious and non-
communicative environment. School officials who know that
students are relying on them to remedy the problems of peer
sexual harassment may also feel increased personal account-
ability to students and their parents.
Finally, the intentional discrimination standard better
recognizes that unlike the employment setting, agency rela-
tionships do not govern the school environment. In Davis, the
Eleventh Circuit appropriately identified several characteris-
tics of the school environment which support granting students
at least as much protection as workplace employees.'9 3 The
Eleventh Circuit, however, failed to recognize that employees
enjoy protection under Title VII, in part, because agency prin-
ciples obligate employers to address sexual harassment. 194
In constructive notice cases, "liability for a hostile work
environment created by a coworker may be imputed to an em-
ployer even though the employer possesses no knowledge of the
hostile environment because the co-worker is an agent of the
employer."195 The agency relationship requirement, however,
poses problems for student plaintiffs seeking to hold schools li-
able under constructive notice. Because agency relationships
193. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text (stating reasons why
students should receive greater protection than employees).
194. See Bruneau, 935 F.3d at 173 (stating that employees are protected by




do not ordinarily exist between schools and their students,9 6
the basis for Title VII constructive notice liability is absent.
Creating quasi-agency relationships between schools and har-
assing students for the purposes of Title IX claims would be
unwise as a matter of policy because it would create precedent
for finding schools liable for the acts of their students in other,
non-harassment situations. The intentional discrimination
standard avoids this problem by requiring actual notice in all
cases. As a result, the intentional discrimination standard bet-
ter recognizes that the agency relationships which permit Title
VII constructive notice claims do not exist in the school setting.
CONCLUSION
LaShonda Davis and countless other victims of peer sexual
harassment exemplify the need for a judicial remedy for peer
sexual harassment. While schools are certainly a place of so-
cial and sexual experimentation, schools as institutions have a
responsibility to keep halls, classrooms, and grounds free from
sexual harassment. The staggering numbers generated by
surveys of young students underscore the reality that many
schools are failing to prevent peer sexual harassment.
Title IX can provide a remedy to victims of peer sexual
abuse whose schools have intentionally ignored their respon-
sibilities to create a safe learning environment. Requiring a
victim of hostile environment peer sexual harassment to prove
that the school intentionally discriminated on the basis of sex
is consistent with Title IX case law. Furthermore, an inten-
tional discrimination standard reconciles the strong public
policy arguments for student protection with the notice re-
quirements associated with Spending Clause statutes. By al-
lowing plaintiffs to establish intentional discrimination
through circumstantial evidence, courts can prevent schools
from ignoring the problems of peer sexual harassment and
guide them to proactive methods of sexual harassment pre-
vention.
196. See id. at 173-74 (finding that a student of an educational institution
is not an agent of that institution unless the student was acting on "behalf of
or with authority from" the institution).
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